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Abstract 
While much work has considered trust’s effect on workplace organization, particularly the granting of job 
autonomy, this relationship remains essentially a black box, lacking insight on the deeper process underlying 
employers’ ultimate trust or autonomy decision. I seek to unpack the trust-organization nexus, focusing on the role 
of employers’ inferences about employees’ trustworthiness. Integrating extant literatures, I posit that employers use 
group membership (and specific group-level traits) as an observable signal concerning individual employees’ 
trustworthiness and decide how much autonomy to grant to employees that have similar observable individual-level 
qualities but belong to different, easily recognizable social groups. Empirical analysis of job autonomy differentials 
between groups of migrants with different ethnonational identities reveals systematic patterns of variation that 
cannot be explained on the basis of observable employee traits alone. Hence, the evidence strongly supports the 
signalling value of group membership, demonstrating an important real-world feature of trust governing workplace 
organization. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of trust in governing workplace organization is widely recognized (Arrow 1974; Granovetter 1985). 
Fukuyama (1995, p. 31), for instance, finds that trust fosters flexibility in the workplace and the assigning of greater 
responsibility at lower levels of the organization. Moreover, by now, there are several studies linking societal 
differences in trust norms to average firm size and, particularly, the granting of autonomy to employees (Bloom et 
al. 2012; La Porta et al. 1997; Van Hoorn 2017). However, insight on deeper processes that play a role in the real-
world link between trust and key features of workplace organization such as job autonomy remains lacking. 
This paper seeks to unpack the black box of trust governing exchange in the context of workplace 
organization, specifically the decision of how much autonomy to grant to an employee. In market settings, trust is 
understood to involve both a willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of the other party and an assessment of the 
counterparty’s trustworthiness (Arrow 1972; Granovetter 1985; North 1990). Not all (potential) exchange partners 
are equally trustworthy and drawing on a variety of signals allows actors to make an informed assessment of the risk 
of transacting with a particular party (Coleman 1990; Gambetta and Hamill 2005; Hardin 2002). In workplace 
settings, principals that outsource tasks to agents are similarly vulnerable to agents’ actions. In general, 
decentralization and outsourcing of tasks are desirable for efficiency reasons. Trust issues, however, prevent 
principals from simply granting complete autonomy to their agents and reap the full benefits of specialization 
through the division of labour. Hence, an essential decision in workplace organization is for employers to 
differentiate between those employees that they can trust more and offer higher degrees of job autonomy to and 
those employees that they can trust less and need to monitor and control more closely. The concrete aim of this 
paper is to uncover some real-world specifics of the process and factors guiding employers in deciding on how much 
autonomy to grant to different employees.1 
The literature with most relevance to this issue involves studies that consider employers differentiating 
between employees in the context of recruitment decisions. Key insights from this literature concern the role of 
signalling (Spence 1974) and statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972). Faced with limited information 
by which to judge potential employees, employers rely on employee signals as well as other observable 
                                                 
1 For this paper, I focus on employer-employee trust and do not consider the reverse relationship, employees trusting 
their employers. In general, however, employee trust is important as well. 
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characteristics to make rational inferences about underlying intangible traits and dispositions (Altonji and Pierret 
2001). Oft-mentioned signals are educational credentials (Chatterji et al. 2003) but also (involuntary) membership to 
a particular social group (e.g., blacks versus whites or males versus females) can be a powerful basis for statistical 
discrimination.2 Also relevant is the literature on trust in game experiments, specifically studies of the effect of 
(unintentional) signals on the amount of trust that an individual trustor places in certain trustees. Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001), for instance, report that among two groups of Israeli Jews, those from European and American 
descent were trusted more than their fellow citizens from Asian and African descent were. Other work finds that 
even a simple signal such as counterparties’ physical appearance can affect trustors’ behaviour in experimental trust 
games (Eckel and Petrie 2011; Van ’t Wout and Sanfey 2008). Experimental results by McEvily et al. (2012) further 
indicate that laboratory trust decisions are shaped by trustors’ perceptions of trustees, which, in turn, are based on 
observable background characteristics. Finally, the analysis of self-reported trust in Uganda by De Luca and 
Verpoorten (2015) finds evidence of distrust towards specific individuals based on these individuals’ association 
with violent events. 
Following the above body of research, the specific feature of the trust-autonomy nexus considered in this 
paper is how group membership, as emphasized by theories of statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972), 
can go on to generate job autonomy differentials between individuals with otherwise similar qualities and features. 
My expectation is that employers use group membership (and specific traits of these groups) as a signal of 
(un)trustworthiness and are more/less willing to grant autonomy to employees belonging to some social groups than 
to others, even when these employees do not deviate on the most important observable individual-level 
characteristics, for example, their education level. Because individual employees’ trustworthiness (or other relevant 
qualities) are only partially observable, employers use alternative, observable characteristics such as membership of 
particular socials group to fill in the blanks. Trustworthiness is often considered in terms of reputation building and 
repeated interactions that allow trust between two parties to develop over time (Dasgupta 1988; Granovetter 1985). 
My interest is not in specifics of the relationship between selected principals and agents, however, but in broad 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, we may distinguish between intentional signals consciously sent by prospective employees and 
unintentional signals or informational cues as derived by employers from observable characteristics of employees. 
This distinction is not material to the analysis in the present paper, however. 
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patterns of group differentials in job autonomy that testify to the real-world process and factors that guide 
employers’ decisions of how much autonomy to grant to specific employee groups. 
Reflective of this interest, the chosen research context for my analysis is a cross-national sample of 
immigrants from different birth countries living in various host countries, which is close to ideal for my purpose 
because ethnonational identity is easily recognizable and widely considered a chief criterion for social categorization 
and group classification (Barth 1969; Jenkins 1994). My empirical evidence subsequently concerns the following 
two distinct but related issues. The first is the broad issue of the presence of variation in job autonomy between 
groups of migrants with different ethnonational identities not accounted for by (easily observable) individual-level 
traits. The second issue concerns specific group-level traits, i.e., features of migrants’ birth countries, that employers 
might draw on to differentiate between migrant groups when deciding on the amount of autonomy to grant to their 
employees. For this latter issue, I focus on the role of the positive or negative image concerning honesty and 
reliability that different birth countries may have, which I operationalize by considering the level of corruption in a 
migrant’s country of birth. The two hypotheses that I test are as follows. The first hypothesis is non-directional and 
states that: controlling for observable individual-level characteristics, there are significant differences in job 
autonomy between groups of migrants from different birth countries. The second hypothesis is more specific and 
states that: the degree to which corruption is institutionalized in a migrant’s country of birth has a negative effect on 
his/her level of job autonomy. The empirical analysis provides robust support for these hypotheses, indicating 
substantial variation in job autonomy between migrants from different birth countries and a strong negative 
relationship between birth-country corruption and job autonomy. These results hold while taking into account 
differences in the main (observable) individual-level factors logically affecting individuals’ job autonomy, for 
instance, education level. Hence, it seems unlikely that these results are driven by variables concerning individual-
level traits that are observed by employers but not adequately controlled for in the empirical analysis. Overall, the 
evidence strongly supports the idea that country of birth, and birth-country corruption in particular, are taken as a 
signal of individual migrants’ trustworthiness and end up affecting how much job autonomy migrant employees 
from different birth countries have in their host countries. 
The key contribution of this paper is to present real-world evidence on an important feature underlying the 
process of trust governing exchange in the context of workplace organization. In doing so, this paper helps extend 
and bring together a set of disparate literatures. While employers’ reliance on employee signals and statistical 
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inferences when making employment decisions is widely recognized, these decisions are typically limited to 
recruitment and selection. Moving beyond initial recruitment decisions, this paper shows the relevance of signalling 
and statistical discrimination also in the post-recruitment managerial treatment of distinct groups of employees. 
Similarly, while prior research has found that various traits of the counterparty can affect an individual’s trusting 
behaviour, this evidence remains limited to decisions made in laboratory settings. This paper, in contrast, has sought 
to consider how employers’ consideration of observable signals of (un)trustworthiness pans out in the real world, 
giving rise to systematic patterns of job autonomy differentials between groups of migrants with different 
ethnonational identities. Finally, though not the main concern of the present paper, the evidence of the effect of birth 
country on individuals’ managerial treatment testifies to the importance of statistical discrimination for the extent to 
which individual migrants are able to integrate successfully in the workplace. As one’s country of birth is strictly 
beyond one’s control, how a migrant’s birth country scores on various indicators may be one of the most significant 
barriers that a migrant faces in achieving professional success in his/her host country. 
 
2. Theoretical background and empirical context 
2.1 Job autonomy and signals of trustworthiness 
This paper’s interest in job autonomy as a key feature of workplace organization resonates with the long-standing 
literature relating the organization of the workplace to possible efficiency gains due to specialization that traces back 
to Adam Smith’s famous pin factory. A straightforward definition of job autonomy is as “the condition or quality of 
being self-governing or free from excessive external control” (Jermier and Michaels 2001, p. 1006). When it comes 
to job autonomy, the ultimate challenge that employers face in deciding how much autonomy to grant to different 
employees is to strike a balance between the costs and benefits of different amounts of autonomy versus the 
intensity of monitoring and control. Monitoring and control thereby have direct costs in terms of taking up some of 
the firm’s resources, for instance, managerial attention, but also indirect costs. More importantly, however, there is 
an essential connection between the costs and benefits of control on the one hand and the costs and benefits of 
autonomy on the other. 
The classic understanding of the specialization benefits of employee autonomy comprises two elements. 
The first is that employees are specialists that have gained unique knowledge on how to perform their production 
tasks most efficiently. The second is that the specific knowledge or skills that employees have accumulated are 
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typically tacit (or at least only partly codifiable) so that leveraging this knowledge requires that employees are 
granted freedom to perform their jobs in the way they deem best. As non-specialists, managers or employers should 
refrain from prescribing employees how they ought to do their job, as the former’s lack of relevant knowledge 
results in a production process that is less efficient than a production process that is organized by specialist 
employees themselves. Part of the costs of monitoring and control is thus that they prevent the reaping of efficiency 
gains from specialization. In contrast, the costs of autonomy are that lack of monitoring and control gives employees 
more opportunity to shirk. If employees have complete autonomy, there is no formal mechanism that ensures that 
employees act in the best interest of their employer or prevents employees from pursuing their own interests at the 
expense of their employers’ interests. The benefits of monitoring and control are that they help reduce employee 
shirking. 
Trustworthiness matters because it changes the balance between the costs and benefits of autonomy versus 
control. If a principal can trust the agent to look after the principal’s interests and not to shirk, there is simply less 
need for monitoring and control so that autonomy can increase, allowing for more efficiency gains from 
specialization (Gur and Bjørnskov 2016; Van Hoorn 2017). Vice versa, the costs of autonomy are higher—and, 
hence, the gains from control higher—in case an employee cannot be relied upon to work diligently, absent any 
formal mechanism for ensuring cooperation. The degree to which specific employees are honest and can be relied 
upon is not typically well known to an employer, however. Trustworthiness is characteristically difficult to observe, 
meaning that employers need to rely on signals such as group membership and information on specific group-level 
traits to make inferences about individual employees’ trustworthiness. These inferences result in differentiation 
between employees and are taken into account in the decision of how much autonomy to grant to specific 
employees. In practice, there can be many signals or traits that employers can draw on to infer trustworthiness. 
Hence, my generic proposition that individuals recognized to belong to social groups with positive/negative images 
concerning their honesty and reliability are deemed more/less trustworthy and have more/less job autonomy. 
 
2.2 Empirical context 
Empirical testing of the above proposition requires a research context that involves multiple social groups as well as 
the possibility of identifying a specific group-level trait that would allow employers to infer differences in 
trustworthiness and adapt their decision on how much autonomy to grant to a particular employee accordingly. As 
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stated, the chosen research context for my empirical analysis is immigrants originating from different countries of 
birth (immigrants with different ethnonational identities). The reason for choosing this particular research context is 
threefold. First, ethnonational background is widely recognized as a chief criterion for social categorization, 
meaning it is common for an individual to classify other individuals into distinct social groups delineated by, say, 
nationality or individuals’ country of birth (Barth 1969; Jenkins 1994). Second, it is common for people to hold a 
stereotypical image of particular countries (Madon et al. 2001; Prothro 1954; Schneider 2005).3 Finally, the content 
of such national stereotypes can be traced back to specific country characteristics, for which ample secondary data 
are available, for instance, countries’ economic status (Lee and Fiske 2006). 
Following my use of a migrant sample, I operationalize the idea of different social groups in terms of 
individuals’ ethnonational background, specifically their country of birth. My first hypothesis derives from the 
generic proposition presented above and concerns assessments of trustworthiness and employers’ use of statistical 
discrimination broadly. Given that observable individual-level traits only go so far in informing employers about an 
employee’s trustworthiness, I deem it likely that group membership, notably ethnonational identity, is a factor that 
employers take into account when deciding how much autonomy to grant to a particular employee. If so, I expect to 
see systematic differences in how much autonomy individuals from different countries of birth have at their jobs. 
Hence, the hypothesis (H1) that, controlling for observable individual-level characteristics, there are significant 
differences in job autonomy between groups of migrants from different birth countries. Importantly, this is a non-
directional hypothesis that is only meant to show the real-world relevance of statistical discrimination and the 
signalling power or group membership, over and above the various observable individual-level traits that employers 
are likely to take into account when deciding how much job autonomy to grant to a particular employee. 
My second concern is with specific group-level traits that employers may take as a signal of individual 
employees’ trustworthiness. Beyond group membership itself, there are many group traits that employers can, in 
principle, draw on to make inferences about employees belonging to a specific group. However, when it comes to 
assessing trustworthiness, the degree to which corruption has been institutionalized in an individual’s birth country 
                                                 
3 For a popular overview of national stereotypes and corresponding graphical illustrations, see, for instance, 
http://www.nationalstereotype.com. 
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would seem a most salient and easily recognizable trait to base one’s inference on.4 I therefore expect that 
systematic differences in the level of corruption in migrants’ birth countries give rise to systematic differences in 
inferred trustworthiness and thus give rise to clear patterns of job autonomy differentials between various migrant 
groups. Hence, the hypothesis (H2) that the higher the level of corruption in a migrant’s birth country, the less job 
autonomy this migrant has in his/her host country. 
I test this hypothesis as well as the hypothesis on variation in job autonomy between migrants from 
different birth countries below. First, however, I discuss some specifics of my empirical method and the data that I 
use to estimate my empirical models. 
 
3. Method and data 
3.1 Method 
The generic empirical model that I use to test H1 and H2 revolves around migrants belonging to different groups, 
i.e., migrants born in different countries. The evidence supports H1 if it shows that a statistically significant amount 
of total variation in job autonomy occurs between migrants from different birth countries. If I control for all the 
relevant individual-level traits that employers can reasonably be expected to observe, any remaining variation 
between migrant groups likely concerns an effect of group membership per se on individuals’ job autonomy. 
                                                 
4 Gächter and Schulz (2016) provide some interesting cross-country evidence on the link between corruption and 
individuals’ trustworthiness on the basis of laboratory behaviour. Specifically, Gächter and Schulz (2016) find that 
intrinsic honesty (as measured in a laboratory game) is higher in countries that have less rule violations such as 
corruption. More generally, it is quite common for countries to be concerned with the negative effect of domestic 
corruption on the country’s image abroad (e.g., India Times 2011; Smith 2007; Reuters 2013). Tirole (1996) 
presents an analysis of how belonging to a social group with a reputation for corruption undermines individual 
incentives for behaving honestly, irrespective of individuals’ intrinsic motivation for being honest. Meanwhile, the 
analysis that follows does not require that there is a perfect link between birth country or birth-country corruption 
and trustworthiness. That is, the concern in this paper is not with the accuracy of birth country as a signal of 
trustworthiness but only with the question whether or not employers appear to use birth country as a signal of 
trustworthiness. 
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Accordingly, my method for testing this hypothesis is variance components analysis (Marchenko 2006) where I 
distinguish between variation between groups and variation between individuals belonging to the same group. The 
corresponding model reads as follows: 
 
ib0bib0100ib euXββA  ,       (1) 
 
where Aim indicates the amount of job autonomy granted to individual i that is born in birth country b, Xib is a set of 
(individual-level) control variables (age, gender, et cetera), β00 is a constant, and eib refers to random disturbance at 
the individual level. The key term in Eq. 1, however, is u0b, which refers to random disturbance at the birth-country 
level and can be used to test my first hypothesis. Specifically, the evidence supports my first hypothesis if var(u0b) 
(or 2u0σ ) is statistically significantly greater than zero (again, after controlling for relevant individual-level 
characteristics that employers can observe). 
To test my second hypothesis, I estimate the following model: 
 
ibib2b10ib εXβCββA  .      (2) 
 
The most important difference between Eq. 2 and Eq. 1 is the adding of a predictor variable at the birth-country 
level. This variable, Cb, denotes the degree to which corruption is institutionalized in the individual’s birth country, 
while Xib is again a set of (individual-level) control variables and εib is a random disturbance term. The evidence 
supports my second hypothesis if the coefficient for birth-country corruption (β1) is statistically significantly 
negative. Importantly, when estimating Eqs. 1 and 2 I take into account that my data have a hierarchical structure 
with individuals nested in birth countries. For Eq. 2 in particular this means that I use robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the birth-country level. Finally, the birth-country subsamples in my analysis can have highly unequal 
size with some subsamples containing very few individual observations. Hence, to assess the robustness of my 
baseline results, I also check whether I obtain similar results when considering only birth-country subsamples with 
pre-specified minimum numbers of individual observations. 
 
3.2 Data source and sample 
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Data for my analysis come from seven waves of the European Social Survey or ESS (European Social Survey 2016), 
supplemented with cross-country data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators or WGI project (World Bank 
2016), among others. The ESS is a bi-annual survey of nationally representative samples from more than 20 
countries, mostly in Europe but also covering such countries as Israel, Turkey and Russia. Following my interest in 
inferences based on group membership, I use only a portion of all respondents in the ESS, namely those respondents 
that currently live in a country other than their birth country. I identify these individuals using the answer to the ESS 
item asking respondents whether they were born in their current country of residence. Foreign-borns from a 
particular birth country living in a particular host country are typically migrants, which have been extensively 
studied using data from the ESS (e.g., Bisin et al. 2011). I further focus on actual employees, meaning that I do not 
consider respondents that are self-employed or working for their own (family) business, as these individuals 
typically are themselves employers rather than employees. Finally, I do not consider the subset of individuals that 
are not living in their birth country, but at the same time are living in the birth country of their parents. An example 
would be a child born abroad during an extended holiday. Excluding respondents with missing data on the variables 
considered in the analysis leaves a main sample of about 11,100 individuals from 170 birth countries. Table A.1 in 
the appendix presents descriptive statistics for a selection of variables used in the analysis, while Table A.2 presents 
an overview of the birth countries in the sample, sorted by number of respondents. More information about the ESS 
is available from the survey’s website, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
 
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent variable. The dependent variable in my analysis is the amount of autonomy an individual 
experiences at his/her job. As a key feature of workplace organization, much effort has been devoted to measuring 
job autonomy, particularly by business and management scholars. The standard approach is to use surveys, asking 
respondents to rate their own autonomy (Hackman and Oldham 1975). I use this standard approach, which has the 
advantage that it does not suffer problems deriving from the fact that formal autonomy or authority of the type that 
can be measured by external observers need not match real autonomy (i.e., the type of autonomy that employees 
actually experience in their daily work activities) (Aghion and Tirole 1997). The wording of the job autonomy item 
included in the ESS is as follows: “Please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to 
decide how your own daily work is/was organised?” And the accompanying answering scale ranges from 0 (“I 
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have/had no influence”) to 10 (“I have/had complete control”). To keep things simple and facilitate interpretation of 
the results, for my main analyses, I assume that job autonomy is measured on a cardinal scale. However, results 
(available on request) are similar when I treat the job autonomy measure as an ordinal indicator and estimate ordered 
probit or ordered logit models instead. Importantly, subjective job autonomy indicators of the type included in the 
ESS, and the ESS survey item in particular, have been widely validated (Morgeson and Humphrey 2006; Van Hoorn 
2016). Table A.3 in the appendix presents some stylized evidence on the construct validity of the ESS job autonomy 
item, particularly on the relationship between measured job autonomy and other features of an individual’s job. If 
the ESS job autonomy measure is valid, we expect, for instance, a positive relation between the non-routineness of 
work and job autonomy and clear differences in job autonomy between the self-employed and ordinary employees, 
which is confirmed by the evidence. 
3.3.2 Main independent variables. Testing my hypotheses involves two different but related independent variables. 
The first, generic variable concerns individuals’ country of birth. If respondents indicated that they were born in 
their country of residence, the ESS followed up with a question asking in which country the respondent was born. 
Hence, I am able t identify migrants’ country of birth. As mentioned, the resulting sample comprises individuals 
from some 170 different countries of birth. My second main independent variable concerns the degree to which 
corruption is institutionalized in the birth countries of the migrants in my sample. The specific measure that I use is 
the Control of corruption measure from the WGI project, which captures “perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2009, p. 6). I recode this measure so that higher scores indicate 
higher levels of corruption in the individual’s country of birth. The WGI project has collected cross-country data bi-
annually since 1996 and annually since 2002. A priori, however, it is not clear that one particular year of observation 
is more representative of former residents of a country that have migrated abroad than another year. I thus calculate 
the average corruption level in the birth country over the years covered by Waves 1-7 of the ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. However, to rule out that my results are sensitive to the period chosen, I repeat my 
baseline analyses replacing this measure of the degree to which corruption is institutionalized in migrants’ birth 
country with a measure of birth-country corruption based on averages over the years prior to 2002 (1996, 1998 and 
2000). As a second alternative to the main independent variable in my analysis, I construct a measure of the cultural 
norm of corruption that exists in the birth country based on Fisman and Miguel’s (2007) data on unpaid parking 
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tickets by UN diplomats in New York. My measure of the cultural norm of corruption in a country is simply the 
average number of unpaid parking violations per country diplomat per year. Meanwhile, a generic challenge to 
considering birth-country differences in corruption is that this measure is not, in fact, very informative of individual 
migrants’ trustworthiness. Above, I already noted that for the validity of my empirical analysis it does not really 
matter whether birth-country corruption is an accurate signal of trustworthiness—the reason is that my only concern 
is whether corruption appears to be used as a signal of trustworthiness and not whether corruption truly reveals 
something about migrants’ actual trustworthiness. Nevertheless, as a further robustness check, I also estimate 
models using two alternative birth-country features that employers may draw on to make inferences about individual 
migrants’ trustworthiness. The first of these is the quality of law enforcement and the judicial system in the birth 
countries of the individuals in my sample. The specific indicator that I use is the Rule of law measure also from the 
WGI project, which captures, among others, “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2009, p. 6). As before, I calculate averages 
for the years 2002-2014, where a higher Rule of law score indicates higher quality law enforcement and less crime 
and violence. The second alternative to corruption concerns corporate ethics in an individual’s birth country. 
Compared to standard corruption measures, corporate ethics is more concerned with firm behaviour and workplace 
practices and less with public officials, meaning that birth-country differences in corporate ethics might be a more 
relevant signal for employers than birth-country corruption is. The specific measure that I use is the corporate ethics 
index developed by Kaufmann (2004). 
3.3.3 Control variables. The analysis in this paper concerns birth country and birth-country corruption as possible 
signals that employers use to make inferences about individual migrants’ trustworthiness and decide how much job 
autonomy to grant to these individuals. Note, though, that not all individual-level traits that are relevant determinants 
of how much autonomy a particular employee is granted are, in fact, unobservable. Education, for instance, seems a 
relevant individual-level trait that employers are able to observe and likely to take into account when deciding how 
much autonomy to grant to a specific employee. Moreover, employers might be able to observe some individual-
level traits that are relevant for job autonomy and also happen to correlate with employees’ birth country or the level 
of corruption in these employees’ countries of birth. If so, any relationship between individuals’ birth country and/or 
birth-country corruption uncovered by my analysis would be spurious, in the sense that it does not really testify to 
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any signalling effect of either birth country or birth-country corruption. Again, education would be a prime example, 
as it seems likely that there is systematic variation in the education level of migrants from different birth countries. 
To address this possible omitted variable bias, my analysis includes a range of control variables. Importantly, 
though, these variables are not considered for the purpose of giving a complete account of all the factors predicting 
job autonomy. Instead, these variables are included as a way of making sure that all relevant factors that can 
reasonably be expected to be observable for employees are, in fact, considered. If all observable individual-level 
traits are adequately controlled for, any remaining effect of birth country or birth-country corruption can be validly 
interpreted as representing a signalling effect that employers use to infer trustworthiness and guide their decision of 
how much autonomy to grant to a particular employee. Stated differently, the reason that group membership is 
expected to matter for job autonomy is precisely that there will be some relevant individual-level traits that neither 
researchers nor employers can observe but that can be proxied on the basis of group membership, specifically 
ethnonational identity. 
That being said, the most basic set of control variables that I include are year/wave dummies, standard 
demographic characteristics (age, age squared, and sex) and dummies for employment status (whether the individual 
is currently in paid work, unemployed and looking for work, unemployed and not looking for work, retired, et 
cetera). Inclusion of host-country dummies further controls for direct effects of host-country environment on job 
autonomy and helps rule out that any relationship between birth country and/or birth-country corruption on the one 
hand and job autonomy on the other is due to a sorting effect of individuals from specific birth countries (e.g., from 
relatively corrupt birth countries) migrating to host countries with relatively low levels of job autonomy. In addition, 
host-country dummies control for any country-specific job autonomy effects due to the presence of certain migrant 
networks or the general attitude towards foreigners in the host country. At the employer-level, I further control for 
the size of the firm or establishment for which the individual is working. The ESS contains an item asking 
respondents how many people are or were employed at the place where the respondent usually works or worked? 
There are five possible answers (under 10; 10 to 24; 25 to 99; 100 to 499; 500 or more), which I code into separate 
dummies. Other factors that I control for are at the level of the individual employee and concern differences in the 
total number of hours normally worked in a week and differences in educational background, specifically the total 
number of years of fulltime education that an individual has and the highest education level that he/she has achieved 
as measured by the International Standard Classification of Education (e.g., “less than lower secondary,” “lower 
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secondary,” or “higher tertiary education”). Given that my sample consists of people that are living abroad as 
migrants, I further control for time spent in the host country (five years or less; six to 10 years; 11 to 20 years; more 
than 20 years) and the language spoken at home, specifically whether the language of the host country is also the 
main language spoken at home or not (1=yes; 0=no) (cf. Hoorn 2016). A final individual-level control variable that I 
consider is individuals’ income. Following the standard signalling perspective and theories of statistical 
discrimination, there is a concern that birth country or birth-country corruption do not inform employers about 
individual migrants’ trustworthiness but about some other unobservable factor that would be taken into account by 
any employer deciding on how much autonomy to grant to a particular employee. The most prominent such 
unobserved factor would be an employee’s ability, which, in turn, may affect job autonomy because the 
specialization and efficiency benefits of delegation and autonomy are greater, the more skilled the employee is. I 
therefore include income as a proxy for ability, as it is known to / observed by the individual’s employer. If the 
relationship between birth country and/or birth-country corruption and job autonomy continues to hold with personal 
income rank controlled for, it seems unlikely that unobserved systematic differences in ability or skills between 
individuals from different birth countries account for this relationship.5 The ESS asks respondents about the total net 
income of their household and classifies their answer on a scale depicting different income brackets. In its first three 
waves (2002-2006), the ESS used a 12-point scale, while the later waves (2008-2014) used a 10-point scale. To 
ensure that measured income is comparable over time and across respondents from different countries, I recode 
answers to create a measure of rank income. Hence, for each respondent, I calculate his/her income percentile 
relative to respondents from the same country surveyed in the same year/wave. To complete my standard set of 
control variables I include three measures of characteristics of the home-host country dyad to which an individual 
belongs. These variables are meant to capture a specific relationship that exists between the home and the host 
                                                 
5 While, in principle at least, there is always a concern that controlling for certain factors increases the risk of a Type 
II error, this risk appears particularly prominent in case of personal income. The reason is that income is also an 
important outcome variable in its own right, particularly when it comes to the labour market performance of foreign-
borns (see Lang and Lehmann 2012 for a survey). Indeed, it seems likely that a process highly similar to the process 
by which decision makers are led to grant more job autonomy to migrants from some birth countries than to 
migrants from other birth countries also affects these individuals’ income. 
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country that would affect job autonomy or factors that may affect the likelihood of a migrant from a given birth 
country to migrate to a given host country (cf. Hoorn 2016). The first dyadic measure is a dummy variable that 
captures whether the host country has the same official language as the birth country has (1=yes; 0=no). The second 
measure is a dummy variable that captures whether the host country is a former colonizer of the birth country 
(1=yes; 0=no). The third measure is a dummy variable that captures whether the home and the host country are 
contiguous (1=yes; 0=no). Data for these dyadic measures come from the famous CEPII GeoDist database (Mayer 
and Zignago 2011). 
In addition to the above set of standard control variables, for my robustness checks I consider four 
additional control variables that speak to possible alternative explanations for an effect of birth country and birth-
country corruption on migrant employees’ job autonomy. The first of these alternative explanations is that the 
measure of job autonomy might be biased because of the particular way in which individuals born (and socialized) 
in certain countries perceive the world. Specifically, there may be social conventions or cultural norms that cause 
individuals to exhibit an upward or downward bias when asked to evaluate and score their own lives. To address this 
contingency I include self-reported happiness as an additional control variable, as this variable seems most 
influenced by such differences in response style. If differences in response style, specifically the tendency to be 
overly negative or overly positive when making a subjective evaluation, truly explain the relationship between birth 
country and birth-country corruption on the one hand and job autonomy on the other, I expect this relationship to 
vanish when self-reported happiness is controlled for. If the effects of birth country and birth-country corruption on 
job autonomy remain with self-reported happiness controlled for, it seems unlikely that the found effects are 
spurious, driven by systematic differences in response style.6 I measure self-reported happiness using the ESS item 
                                                 
6 I obtain similar results (available on request) when instead of controlling for self-reported happiness, I control for 
response style using self-reported job satisfaction, which has the advantage that it pertains directly to individuals’ 
jobs. However, using job satisfaction comes at the cost of a much smaller sample (some 1,880 individuals from 133 
birth countries), making self-reported happiness my preferred response style control variable. As with income, an 
important concern with controlling for happiness is that it also an outcome variable. In fact, it seems likely that job 
autonomy is a mediator in any relation between birth country and happiness, as having relatively little autonomy at 
work makes individuals’ jobs less pleasant and interesting, which, in turn, lowers their happiness. 
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asking individuals: “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” Respondents can answer on a 
Likert-type scale that ranges from 0, “extremely unhappy” to 10, “extremely happy.” 
A second alternative explanation for birth country and birth-country corruption affecting job autonomy 
involves employees’ preference for job autonomy. So far, I have grounded my analysis in the idea that employers 
rely on specific observable signals of trustworthiness when deciding how much job autonomy to grant to an 
employee, particularly to employees from different birth countries. This perspective is one-sided, however, in the 
sense that it neglects the possibility that individuals from different birth countries may simply have different value 
preferences, meaning that individuals born in certain countries attach much less value to job autonomy than 
individuals from other birth countries do. If migrants from some birth countries also care less about job autonomy 
(e.g., for cultural reasons), the effect of birth country on job autonomy could be spurious, reflecting a simple 
difference in preferences rather than a process of employers relying on signals of trustworthiness to determine how 
much autonomy to grant to specific employees. Controlling for differences in personal values enables me to rule out 
such a preference-based explanation for the effects of birth country and birth-country corruption on job autonomy. 
Values speak to people’s deepest motivations, the importance they attach to certain objectives compared to other 
objectives, and provide cross-situational guidance to individuals when selecting between alternative courses of 
action or states of affairs (Schwartz 1992). The personal values that I consider derive from the framework of 
universal human values developed by Shalom Schwartz and collaborators (e.g., Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky 
1987), which is the standard values framework in psychology. Specifically, I consider the two-overarching values 
dimensions in this framework, so-called openness-to-change versus conservation values and self-transcendence 
versus self-enhancement values. A high score on openness-to-change versus conservation indicates that an 
individual attaches relatively much value to hedonism, stimulation and self-direction and relatively little value to 
tradition, conformity and security. A high score on self-transcendence versus self-enhancement indicates that an 
individual attaches relatively much value to universalism and benevolence and relatively little value to power and 
achievement. Details on the ESS items—21 in total—and the procedure used to measures these two values 
dimensions are presented in Schwartz et al. (2001) and are available on request as well. 
A third alternative explanation for an effect of birth country and birth-country corruption on migrant 
employees’ job autonomy involves migrants’ tendency to work in specific industries. My analysis focuses on the 
direct effect of inferred trustworthiness on the amount of autonomy that an employer grants to different employees. 
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Alternatively, inferred trustworthiness may influence recruitment, as when only employees that are deemed 
trustworthy are hired to work in high-autonomy industries, while employees that are deemed untrustworthy end up 
working in low-autonomy industries. If so, birth country and birth-country corruption may affect individuals’ 
autonomy via inferred trustworthiness, but through the channel of recruitment, which is a different channel than is 
the focus of this paper. Controlling for average job autonomy in individuals’ industry allows me to check whether 
the observed relationship between birth country and job autonomy is perhaps due to such an indirect selection effect 
or due to the direct effect emphasized in this paper.7 Across its seven waves, the ESS has recorded the industry in 
which respondents work using different revisions of the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities). My measure of average job autonomy involves averaging across each two-digit industry thus 
included and combining the resulting scores in a single industry autonomy measure. 
A final alternative explanation concerns the signalling value of birth-country corruption. My analysis 
considers birth-country corruption in an attempt to uncover a specific group-level trait that might be underlying the 
broader effect of group membership on job autonomy. However, compared to the testing of the generic signalling 
value of birth country, the analysis of birth-country corruption is much more sensitive to the possibility of an 
omitted variable bias. That is, even when we find that birth-country corruption correlates with job autonomy there 
remains a possibility that another birth-country variable that is also easily observable and not birth-country 
corruption is driving this relationship. A specific concern is that birth-country corruption correlates with the quality 
of education in the birth country and thus with individuals’ skills, which, in turn, are expected to have a strong effect 
on how much autonomy an employer is willing to grant to particular individuals. If so, the corruption-autonomy 
relationship found in my baseline analysis may be spurious, reflecting the signalling effect of birth-country quality 
of education rather than of birth-country corruption. However, if the relationship between birth-country corruption 
and job autonomy remains with quality of education in the birth country controlled for, it seems likely that birth-
country corruption indeed acts as an observable signal of (un)trustworthiness that employers rely on when deciding 
how much autonomy to grant to specific groups of employees. To measure the quality of the educational system in 
                                                 
7 Of course, this argument also implies that industry can be an important mediator in the relationship between birth 
country and job autonomy and that controlling for industry increases the risk of making a Type II error (cf. Notes 5 
and 6). 
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different countries, I use indicators of student performance in the areas of Mathematics, Reading and Science 
collected by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) at the OECD. These data are not available 
for the majority of birth countries in my sample. However, using data collected in the 2012 round of the PISA 
(OECD 2012), I am able to retain 60 birth countries (see Table A.2 in the appendix). Because country mean scores 
on Mathematics, Reading and Science are strongly correlated (r > .95), I add the measures of performance in 
Mathematics, Reading and Science to construct a single country index of average student performance. For 
completeness, however, I also present results for models that include separate country scores on Mathematics, 
Reading and Science. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
Table 1 presents the results of my baseline analysis. Confirming H1, results reveal that a statistically significant 
amount of total variation in job autonomy occurs between individuals from different birth countries (Model 1). 
Similarly, results indicate a strong, statistically highly significant negative correlation between birth-country 
corruption and the amount of job autonomy an individual migrant has, which confirms H2 (Model 4). The empirical 
evidence therefore strongly supports the idea that country of birth and birth-country corruption are taken as a signal 
of individual migrants’ trustworthiness, which, in turn, affects how much job autonomy migrant employees are 
granted in their host countries. Inclusion of some additional control variables, particularly income, lowers the 
amount of variation between birth countries (Models 2 and 3) and the coefficient for birth-country corruption 
(Models 5 and 6). Both the effect of birth country and of birth-country corruption remains highly statistically 
significant, however. As I have standardized my coefficients, effect sizes can easily be gauged by looking at the 
estimated coefficients. On this count, birth country seems quite important, although some individual-level variables 
are clearly more important predictors of job autonomy, notably income. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
4.2.1 Alternative explanations. Although the models estimated above control for such factors as years of education, 
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hours worked and income, the main concern with my baseline results is the possibility of an omitted variable bias 
and alternative explanations of the found effects of birth country and birth-country corruption on job autonomy. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for various models that add control variables to rule out such alternative 
explanations. While most of the factors highlighted as possible confounders, notably personal values (Model 8 in 
Table 2 and Model 14 in Table 3), are indeed important predictors of job autonomy, both the effect of birth country 
and of birth-country corruption remain. Hence, even though controlling for, say, happiness might be inappropriate 
from a theoretical perspective, my baseline results survive also this very stringent way of assessing the potential 
spuriousness of and alternative explanations for the found effects of birth country and birth-country corruption on 
job autonomy. Effect sizes are smaller than before (cf. Table 1), but this is as expected and of course also consistent 
with theoretical arguments concerning the direct and indirect effects of birth country on, among others, migrants’ 
happiness (cf. Notes 5-7). Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient for some of the added control variables may be 
smaller than expected, for instance, for birth-country quality of education. There is a simple, generic explanation for 
small effect sizes, however, which is that a sizeable effect size requires that employers are able to take into account 
how employees score on a particular variable, which, in turn, requires that this variable is easily observable by these 
same employers. The more difficult it is for employees to observe a particular (group-level or individual-level) trait 
of an employee, the less effect this trait will have on how much autonomy the employee is granted. 
 
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
 
4.2.2 Minimum number of individual observations per birth-country subsample. As mentioned, the birth-country 
subsamples in my analysis are of differing size and some birth-country subsamples comprise relatively few 
individual observations. To deal with this issue and address potential biases, I first repeat my baseline analysis using 
bootstrapping procedures to obtain estimates for my standard errors. Results obtained using bootstrapping are almost 
identical to my baseline results (details available on request). However, as the main check of the potential sensitivity 
of my results to the small size of some of the birth-country subsamples, I repeat my baseline analysis excluding birth 
countries that do not have a certain minimum number of individual observations (cf. Table A.2 in the appendix). 
Scenarios with different minimums (2, 10 or 50) all render results that are almost identical to my baseline results 
(Table A.4 in the appendix). In fact, if anything, the size of the coefficient for birth-country corruption tends to 
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increase a bit when fewer birth countries are considered. Hence, there is no indication that the original results are 
biased for including relatively small birth-country subsamples. 
 
4.2.3 Alternative measures of main independent variable. For my last robustness check, I test whether my baseline 
results concerning the effect of birth-country corruption on job autonomy are sensitive to the use of corruption as a 
group-level trait that employers take into account when deciding how much job autonomy to grant to individuals 
from specific birth countries. First, I substitute the measure of birth-country corruption used for my baseline 
analyses with an alternative measure of birth-country corruption based on data covering the period 1996-2000 
instead of the period 2002-2014. Results are largely the same as before (Model A7 in Table A.5). Similarly, the 
relationship between birth-country corruption and migrants’ job autonomy is robust to using the measure of the 
cultural norm of corruption in the birth country based on Fisman and Miguel’s (2007) country averages of unpaid 
diplomatic parking violations instead of corruption as a proxy for migrants’ perceived honesty and reliability (Model 
A8 in Table A.4). The size of the estimated coefficient is smaller than before, but this is as expected given that birth-
country societal norms are likely much less observable by host-country employers than actual corruption is. Finally, 
considering other birth-country characteristics as observable signals of individual migrants’ trustworthiness confirms 
the basic expectation of employers taking into account group-level traits when deciding how much autonomy to 
grant to different groups of employees (Models A9 and A10 in Table A.5). In particular, using measures of birth-
country Rule of law or Corporate ethics obtains the same relationship between birth-country image and individuals’ 
job autonomy, although the sign of the coefficients is of course reversed compared to the measure of corruption used 
to estimate my earlier models.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has sought to unpack the black box of trust shaping workplace organization. Although the role of trust in 
providing governance to workplace organization is widely recognized, for practical reasons, in quantitative work 
this idea has been watered down to testing relationships between a measure of trust as the independent variable and 
some feature of workplace organization as the dependent variable. Notably, there are several studies finding that 
stronger societal trust norms increase the amount of autonomy that employers grant to their employees, which is an 
understandable simplification from a practical perspective. As is, we lack empirical insight on the deeper process 
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underlying employers’ ultimate trust or autonomy decision. 
Trust decisions involve not only a willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of the other party but also an 
assessment of the counterparty’s trustworthiness. For my unpacking of the trust-organization nexus, I have analysed 
this latter feature of the decision to trust, using job autonomy as the dependent variable. When it comes to 
trustworthiness and job autonomy, the key challenge that employers face is to make an informed decision about 
which employees can be trusted with higher amounts of autonomy and which employees need to be monitored and 
controlled more closely. Prior work, particularly theories of signalling and statistical discrimination, have argued the 
power of signals in informing decision makers. Similarly, laboratory studies have found that even simple 
informational cues can affect trustors’ behaviour in experimental trust games. Building on these bodies of research, I 
proposed that employers take into account employees’ membership of particular social groups as a way of inferring 
trustworthiness and, ultimately, deciding on how much job autonomy to grant to specific individual employees. I 
tested this proposition empirically in the context of migrants originating from different birth countries and using 
both the country of birth itself and the degree to which corruption has been institutionalized in these birth countries 
as an observable signal of individuals’ (un)trustworthiness. Specifically, I considered whether there is systematic 
variation in job autonomy granted to migrants from different birth countries and whether migrants from birth 
countries in which corruption is more pervasive, on average, have less job autonomy compared to immigrants from 
birth countries in which corruption is less pervasive. In a cross-national sample comprising some 11,100 migrants 
from about 170 birth countries, I found strong support for these hypotheses. Extensive robustness checks ruled out 
alternative explanations for these findings, for instance, systematic birth-country differences in the preference for 
job autonomy. Overall, this paper contributes important real-world evidence on process-oriented features of trust 
governing exchange in the context of workplace organization. In addition, the evidence presented in this paper 
demonstrates how birth country can be an important determinant of how migrant employees are treated and their 
ability to integrate successfully in their places of work. 
These contributions notwithstanding, there are also several limitations to the analysis presented in this 
paper. First, this paper has not studied individual employers and their actual trust and autonomy decisions. Rather, 
this paper has focused on outcomes of trust decisions and patterns in the data consistent with a particular process by 
which employers decide how much autonomy to grant to specific employees. Accordingly, the analysis remains 
indirect, which, in turn, leaves more room for confounding influences than, for instance, a laboratory experiment 
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would leave. I do not think that confounding influences do, in fact, bias my results, given the various alternative 
explanations considered and the extent to which my analysis controls for observable individual-level traits likely to 
affect how much autonomy employers grant to a specific employee. Moreover, the indirect approach has some clear 
advantages over laboratory experiments that focus on individual decision makers, as the results provide direct 
evidence on individuals’ real-world experiences and, as such, do not suffer low external and ecological validity. 
Laboratory experiments could be helpful, however, for probing deeper in the process of inferring trustworthiness, 
including analyses of the weight that employers assign to different employee signals and group-level traits. 
A second limitation is that the social group—i.e., migrants from different birth countries—and the group-
level trait empirically analysed in this paper have been rather narrow. Although I cannot see any reason why the 
underlying mechanism of relying on group membership and group-level traits to infer trustworthiness would not 
generalize to other social groups, a logical avenue for future research is to extent the analysis presented here to 
consider other types of groups in society and other salient group-level traits. 
Finally, it has been beyond the scope of the present analysis to link the evidence on group-level traits 
shaping employers’ decisions of how much autonomy to grant to specific employees to organizational performance. 
A generic concern with statistical discrimination is that it can lead to suboptimal allocation decisions, since a 
consequence of considering groups as a whole is that specific qualities of some individual employees remain 
underappreciated. For job autonomy we expect the same outcome of some individual employees being granted less 
autonomy than would be optimal in terms of maximizing the net sum of efficiency gains due to specialization minus 
the costs of shirking. However, future work is needed to assess the actual performance consequences of biased 
managerial treatment on the count of group-level inferences concerning individual employees’ trustworthiness. This 
paper, then, provides a stepping stone towards studying this and other important features of trust as a provider of 
governance in the context of workplace organization. 
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